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Abstract 
 
The triangular relationship amongst Egypt, Great Britain, and the United States serves as 
a microcosm for the larger international context of the 1920s.  Importantly, the relationship 
reveals much about Egypt’s decolonization and national development strategies in the 1920s.  
The increasing internationalism of the 1920s offered new avenues to pursue national interests. 
Because of a changing a status quo, Egypt had an opportunity to reform old institutions and 
choose new paths of national development.  Despite the colonial baggage carried by Egypt, 
national strategies near the end of the 1920s placed the country in a position to exert leverage on 
the international community not possible even in the aftermath of World War I within the 
international context of the British Empire.    
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Introduction 
Historians have not spilled much ink writing about the role of the United States in 
British-Egyptian relations in the 1920s.  While well documented tensions existed between the 
United States and Great Britain in the 1920s over the gold standard, trade (e.g. the Rubber War), 
oil (e.g. San Remo 1920), and international prestige (e.g. naval superiority and the Washington 
Conference), these issues are not extended to other regions of the international arena such as 
Egypt.  Like the Anglo-American rivalry, histories of the British in Egypt during the 1920s are 
also bilateral in nature, either justifying or criticizing British imperial policy.  A few works have 
included the United States in the political equation, notably for the influence of missionaries, 
archaeologists, and recently the “disillusionment of the Wilsonian moment.”  Erez Manela, the 
latest scholar to address this topic, rightly considered the rosy coverage of the Americans and 
U.S. policy in Egypt as an insufficient historical explanation.1  His work built upon the works of 
others whose coverage of the United States in Egypt in the 1920s perpetuated the misconception 
that the United States subordinated its policy objective for the Middle East and Africa to Great 
Britain.  Manela revealed a pattern of negative American influence in Egypt, which severely 
undercut the notion that the United States was on the sidelines during the 1920s.    
Most history books address the importance of Egypt in terms of its ancient legacy, the 
British occupation and protectorate, and its strategic importance during the Cold War.  The most 
discussed topic, the Suez Canal, was already a geo-political asset for Britain in the late 19th 
century, especially after the 1882 occupation.  While the need for control of the Suez Canal was 
a constant from the 19th century until its nationalization during the Cold War, other issues were 
also important.  In the 1920s legal, economic, and political issues in Egypt are salient to 
understanding the fluid international system as a whole.  The decade after World War I was both 
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a decade of western collusion against Egyptian sovereignty and a decade of challenge to the 
British colonization of Egypt.  The 1924 Egyptian Parliamentary agenda was the manifestation 
of a strategy to challenge the remaining obstructions to national sovereignty found in the 
reservation clauses of the 1922 British declaration of Egyptian independence and foreign 
intrusion. 
While the “Wilsonian Moment,” (1918-1919) is crucial to understanding the events to 
follow, the Egyptian strategies of 1924-1930 were not limited or contained solely by this one 
paradigm.  The explanation of events is even more complex, simultaneously going back further 
in history and also more deeply immersed in the contemporary historical context.  A centuries 
old practice known as Capitulations and an Egyptian Capitulation reform strategy known as the 
Mixed Courts of Egypt placed heavy burdens on Egypt in the 1920s.  United States’ national 
policy created tension with Britain, but also participated in the Capitulations systems.  Since the 
United States opted not to participate directly in the new versions of colonialism following 
World War I, namely establishing League of Nations mandates, it was important to maintain 
mechanisms of influence in foreign nations.  Just as the United States needed the “open door” to 
prevent fighting over extra-territorial rights in China, the United States needed to keep the “door 
open” in Egypt.  However, because of the colonial presence of Great Britain, the only 
mechanism available to the United States was a reliance on extra-territorial rights.  Because of 
the developments of the 1920s, this reliance shrank as a result of Egypt’s strategy evolved into a 
national development campaign which depended on the eradication of the Capitulations.  In 
order to accomplish their national objectives, Egyptian political figures sought to align Egypt 
with international developments as they occurred in the 1920s in order to weaken the foreign 
control of their government.  Despite the United States being a participant in the Capitulations 
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practice, Egypt saw opportunity in a new partnership with the United States.  Egypt used bi-
lateral and multi-lateral agreements with the United States to weaken the colonial hold of Great 
Britain and at the same time exerted leverage on the international situation by being a part of the 
new world order envisioned by the United States near the end of the decade.    
A new contextual understanding of the 1920s should stress the United States’, Great 
Britain’s and Egypt’s national strategies not solely in bi-lateral terms, but would allow for a 
larger triangular perspective.  This triangular relationship amongst the three nations has several 
implications.  First, the triangular perspective elevates Egyptian ‘nationalism’ to the status of 
political and economic development to which the United States and Great Britain also focused 
their attention.  Second, it reveals how the Egyptian strategy to incorporate itself into the new 
international framework was a successful step in trying to shed the burdens of the Capitulations 
and the remaining British colonial presence.  Third, the triangular relationship is crucial to 
understanding the ambivalent views that the United States had toward the Capitulations and 
toward Egypt as a whole.  Fourth, it is necessary to understand the relationship of the three 
nations because their policies are all nationalistic in the self serving sense, yet a kind of high 
stakes negotiation took place bi-laterally between the three nations, in which collusion was 
commonplace.  Finally, this constructed relationship intertwines the major events of the decade 
and the events local to Egypt and paints a more comprehensive image of 1920s diplomacy.   
The Impact of Woodrow Wilson on the Political Relations of Great Britain and Egypt  
 The Egyptians and many other colonized peoples were well aware of the promise that 
Wilson’s conception of a new world order offered to nations in similar situations.2  As Manela 
argued, the failure of Wilson and the United States to deliver on the political promises of “self-
governance” and “consent of the governed” disillusioned the Egyptians such as Sa’d Zaghlul, the 
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leader of the nationalist Wafd party.  Zaghlul possessed only a copy of Wilson’s fourteen points 
when arrested by the British authorities for trying to take his grievances to the leaders of the 
world during the Paris Peace talks of 1919.3  The Egyptians, aspiring for independence from the 
British, refused to reconcile the hypocrisy of the basis of the new world order based on the 
consent of the governed.4  Zaghlul felt that the allowance of the British Protectorate to continue 
“violated the spirit of the age.”5  As a result of the compounding infractions against Egypt, the 
Egyptian political leaders demonstrated a decreased willingness to seek a negotiated, gradual 
resolution with Britain within the context of Capitulations throughout the decade.  Britain failed 
to appease the Egyptians despite the recommendations of the Milner Report of 1919 that Britain 
find a way to reconcile the aims of the Protectorate and the agenda of the Wafd.   
In terms of American reaction to the developments in Egypt after the Wilsonian moment, 
U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing and Allen Dulles of the State Department’s Near Eastern 
Division recommended that the U.S. ignore any petition or letter sent from the Egyptian 
nationalists, especially when violence was involved in their tactics.6  Yet the United States 
attempted to mitigate the political damage to America’s reputation by attaching wording to their 
consent of the British Protectorate government over Egypt in 1919.  The unfulfilling attempt 
read: “The President and the American people have every sympathy with the legitimate 
aspiration of the Egyptian people for a further measure of self-government but they view with 
regret any effort to obtain the realization thereof by a resort to violence.”7  The political 
explanation for this statement is that Great Britain had urged the United States to support its 
endeavor and curb their inflammatory rhetoric of independence because it risked spreading 
fanaticism including the possibility of a “holy war against the infidels” according to a 
confidential memo send by Arthur Balfour in April 1919 to the British Government.8  The fear of 
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extremism around the world (including the spread of Bolshevism) shaped a great deal of U.S. 
policy in the 1920s9.    
 Egypt faced many obstacles to national development long before the Wilsonian moment.  
The interference of foreign Powers in Egypt dated back centuries.  Just a year prior to the 
“universal” call for self- determination, an American representative in Egypt noted that in Egypt 
is “anything of political interest is...of a purely domestic character.”10  Hampson Gary, the 
American Diplomatic Agent and Consul General in Cairo, reported that in the spring of 1918, 
“the abolition of the Capitulations is the chief subject of political interest in Egypt.”11  Even 
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes wrote in 1922 that official U.S. recognition of the 
British unilateral declaration of independence for Egypt was dependent on “the maintenance of 
the rights of the United States of America, as they hitherto existed.” He continued that his 
intention was “to leave no room for doubt of the maintenance of capitulatory and commercial 
rights and most favored nation treatment for the United States.”12  In this intersection of domestic 
reform of centuries old agreements in an international system that prevented unilateral self 
remedy, the diplomatic episodes of the 1920s Egypt take on an even more complex meaning.  
Egypt framed their political arguments within a much larger discourse that included, but was not 
limited to, the disillusionment with Wilson and the West’s hypocrisy.  In fact, as the 1920s 
progressed, discussion of Wilson disappeared and Egypt focused on other reform issues.  
Manela’s recent scholarship addressed an earlier Egyptian nationalism, but described it 
as a proto-nationalism at most.13  Manela focuses on the terminology of “the nation” as a post 
World War I phenomenon for much of the colonized world.  However, the Egyptian strategies 
first and foremost were anti-colonial going back to the 19th century.  For instance, Husayn al- 
Marsafi’s (1881) The Essay on Eight Words, discusses the concept of “umma” i.e. community or 
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nation as his first of eight concepts.  Al- Marsafi’s work was one of many political writings of 
the 1860s and 1870s that “introduced new themes such as nationalism.”14  As a result, the 
strategies of the 1920s fit within a larger post- colonial context that dates back at least until 1869 
(Nubar Pasha’s Mixed Courts) and not just the political developments of the “Wilsonian 
moment” and the attempted resolution of the First World War.   
The Capitulations and the First Egyptian Reform Strategy: The Mixed Courts 
The origins and opinions of the Capitulations are varied depending on the author’s 
perception of the nature of empire and whether the Capitulations are considered rights verses 
privileges.15  Because of the traditionally large numbers of Europeans living in Egypt since the 
sixteenth century, the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire made certain treaty agreements with 
individual European nations to insure a European standard of legal, economic, and political 
expectations for visitors.  These extra-territorial privileges were called the “Capitulations.”  The 
agreements were not “imposed by superior force; they were privileges granted as a result of 
treaties freely negotiated between equals.”16  A slightly different interpretation illustrated how 
much controversy would arise over the nature of these agreements.  Evelyn Baring (Lord 
Cromer) cited Van Dyck’s work Ottoman Capitulations, which stated that Capitulations were 
“letters of privilege” or “sworn diplomas” and this semantic difference was important since the 
Ottomans seemingly would not have altruistically concluded treaties providing enumerable rights 
with European.  The agreements were enticements, privileges, to encourage potential foreign 
property holders.17  The American Diplomatic Agent and Consul- General in Cairo in 1918, 
himself cited Lord Cromer, which is indicative of the largely paternalistic and self interested 
agendas of the foreign powers who benefited from the Capitulations.  Cromer argued that the 
Egyptians had enough independence from the Ottoman Empire to arrange their own agreements 
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with the foreign Powers and thus modify those agreements.  As a result, these agreements were 
not detrimental to Egypt in Cromer’s opinion.18  Yet by the 1920s, the Egyptians had lost the 
ability to modify these diplomatic agreements unilaterally.    
The original recipients of the special agreements were the merchants of Venice, Genoa, 
and Pisa.19  Later other European countries sought such treaty agreements in order “to confer 
upon European Christian communities such immunities from the Shari a Law, and autonomy in 
matters of personal status, as to enable them to live with reasonable freedom and convenience in 
the Ottoman dominions.”20  The Ottoman Empire benefited as well, for the Capitulations 
“encouraged westerners to invest in and do business in Ottoman territories.”21  Over the centuries 
and into the nineteenth century, the Capitulations “began to take the form of a compulsory 
limitation on the legislative and executive powers of a state.”22  The focus of the tension shifted 
from religious and cooperative functionality to commercial and property interest.  In order to 
protect national business and proprietary interests in Egypt, “diplomatic pressure settled a case 
more often then the actual merits.”23  In 1869, Egyptian political leader Nubar Pasha, a minister 
in Sultan Ismail’s Egyptian government, argued for a solution to this international problem.24  
His solution was the Mixed Courts of Egypt.  The same year that Nubar argued for this new 
avenue of justice, the Suez Canal opened.  The global importance of Suez, especially to Britain, 
added yet another layer to Egypt’s problems.   
Great Britain, Austria – Hungary, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and the United States 
attended a conference in 1869 in order to address the already existing concerns over the 
protection and enforcement of the Capitulatory rights and Nubar’s concerns.25  This court system 
would hypothetically remove the problems regarding foreigners, and by 1875 “onward, any 
European who had a claim either against an Egyptian or against the Egyptian Government, had 
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no longer been under the necessity of seeking diplomatic support.” 26  Nubar had two main 
reasons for desiring this institution.  The first one had a direct connection to the then-held 
political belief justifying the presence of the Capitulations.  Nubar saw in the Courts the 
possibility to show that “justice, especially economic justice was possible in Egypt.”  If 
economic justice was possible in Egypt, then business and foreign investors would be safe, 
complacent, and productive.  The second desire was to erect a “legal barrier between the 
population of Egypt and the capricious despotism of the Khedive.”27  Most in Egypt viewed the 
Khedive as a puppet of the British not a servant of the Egyptians.  This perception only 
exacerbated the underlying foundation of the economic and political battle in the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century.  The Egyptian nationalists of the post World-War I era would eventually 
find fault with the Mixed Court as a perpetuation of the Capitulations system of international 
relations.  The Mixed Courts were viewed by many, before Egyptian objections arose, as a win 
for both Egypt and the rest of the world.28  
In the original composition of the Mixed Courts, three Courts of First Instance were 
situated at the locations of Cairo, Alexandria, and Mansourah.  The Court of Appeal was located 
in Alexandria.  Even during the initial stages, the composition of the court was a contested issue.  
The original agreement found that while Egyptian judges had to serve on all benches, “the real 
work was done by Europeans.”29  Judges were important because it was not until 1889 that 
Egyptian parliament would create laws.  The Mixed Courts, composed of a number of judges 
from fourteen Capitulatory countries, made the law in Egypt with no existing mechanism to 
override a ruling.30  The Mixed Courts mainly ruled on civil and commercial matters. Despite 
Nubar Pasha’s original intention for the Courts to include criminal matters, criminal cases were 
decided in the consular courts of the defendants’ home country.  
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In 1873, the five-year trial period for the Mixed Courts, agreed to by all except France, 
did not bring about all of its intended consequences.31  The Mixed Courts actually “had provided 
a convenient channel” for diplomatic pressure instead of relieving it.   Even in cases within the 
legal scope of the Court, political issues still arose.  In fact, Khedive Ismail was overthrown in 
1881 as part of the Colonel Arabi coup d’état and in part because Europe took him to the Mixed 
Courts over his outstanding debts.32  The verdict ordered him to pay, which caused domestic 
turmoil.33  For Egypt, the Mixed Courts was an attempt to protect Egyptian national interests in 
the international arena, but the solution created a plague for Egyptian domestic politics. 
Egypt: Pawn and Backdrop for International Relations 
The use of the Mixed Courts had both immediate and long term implications for both 
Egypt and the international relations system.  During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
Great Britain was the junior partner of France in dealing with Egypt.34  Great Britain had little 
interest in anything besides an independent Egypt within the context of the Capitulations.35  The 
contentious political problem was the enormous debt that the Egyptian Government owed to 
Britain as well as other countries.  In 1876, Great Britain sent Stephen Cave to audit the Egyptian 
credit situation.  Cave attempted to alleviate concerns, yet the rest of Europe did not sit quietly as 
they saw Great Britain slowly assuming control of Egyptian finances.36  For instance, Germany 
had threatened first to use the Mixed Courts in order to regain the money owed to it.  If the 
courts did not advance German economic interests, other more drastic measures might follow.37   
Britain tried to convince France to leave Egypt once Ismail was no longer in power, but 
the French did not agree.38  Following another commission to readjust Egypt’s payment of credit, 
the tension with Egypt continued.39  The British and French debated their course of action.  
Anglo - French Dual Control, without an actual occupation, was still the preferred policy of 
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choice in 1881.  Neither country sought Dual Occupation as a policy at this time.  Some form of 
“an accommodation with one of the Egyptian nationalist groups… seemed the most immediately 
promising.”40   
The conflicting perspectives of the British and French foreign secretaries brought even 
more tension to the equation during the fall of 1881.  The French Foreign Minister Leon M. 
Gambetta and Britain’s Foreign Secretary Lord Granville had opposite positions on how to 
handle the Egyptian situation.  Gambetta wanted to scare the Egyptian army and nobles into 
shape; whereas, Granville felt that they should “let things dawdle.”  Gambetta’s plan had 
“destroyed any possibility of co – operation with moderate Egyptian nationalism.”41  Instead of 
uniting the army and nobles with Great Britain and France, as Gambetta had hoped, the two 
Egyptian groups joined ranks with the growing religious extremist movements of the day.  The 
new coalition opposed any sort of European intervention, no matter what the intention.42   
The extent of the new situation in Egypt was not merely a financial credit adjustment.  
The political crisis had developed in a way that now “jeopardiz[ed] the lives of Europeans 
residents” in Egypt.  Accordingly, the British and French sought a solution that “extricated 
themselves from the situation in which M. Gambetta’s precipitancy had placed them.”43  The 
Dual Control of France and Great Britain ended when France’s domestic politics moved them 
closer to Lord Granville’s previous position.  Contrary to the French move and Lord Granville’s 
position, the British assumed a much more aggressive role.  The British involved themselves 
directly in Egyptian domestic politics by overthrowing the nationalistic government in 1882 run 
by Colonel Ahmed Pasha Arabi and trying to replace the Khedive, the ruler they had supported 
before Arabi’s seizure of power.  Following the British military occupation of Egypt in 1882 and 
the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904, Britain assumed sole control of Egypt.44   
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This new situation still posed foreign policy problems for Great Britain because its main 
focus was still “maintaining the balance of power in Europe.”  Great Britain viewed their 
Egyptian entanglement as a “nuisance” and a “distraction from European affairs on which her 
traditional foreign policy was based.”45  Nevertheless, Britain rejected a French proposal to 
restore Dual Control. In retaliation, France announced defiantly that she would “resume its 
liberty of action in Egypt.”  This defiance “amounted to an unrelenting and unreasoning hostility 
to Great Britain in Egypt which was persisted in every method short of war for a period of 
twenty years.”46  Following the Entente Cordiale, the Capitulations dominated foreign policy 
decisions concerning Egypt for both Egypt and the rest of the Powers.  This was the last open 
door for the Great Powers besides Britain to operate in Egypt.47  Great Britain’s policy evolved 
into its second phase when Great Britain declared Egypt a Protectorate, claiming to have special 
ties to Egypt. 
The British Protectorate of Egypt began in 1914.  The relationship was symbiotic in the 
eyes of the British economic interests which sought to protect Egypt’s cotton markets and the 
Suez from Turkish threats.48  While the Egyptian constitutionalist party was against the Khedive, 
they felt that it would be detrimental to force or ask the British to leave because of the looming 
Turkish threat, which materialized on November 6, 1914, when Turkey and Great Britain 
declared war on each other.  As World War I increased the usual importance of the Suez Canal, 
the “imperial lifeline to India,”49 Great Britain “would take upon herself the whole burden of the 
defense of Egypt.”50  Because of the “self imposed mission” to protect Egyptian and therefore 
British interests, total independence was not an option that Britain could offer Egypt.51 
In 1917, as Ahmed Fuad had begun his rule as Sultan, the British domestic political 
situation was tenuous.  Britain considered tightening their control of Egypt; however, they could 
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not do it because of resulting outcry from the nationalists.52  The tension existed not only in 
Great Britain, but also the rest of Europe, which reacted negatively to a British commission 
calling for judicial and capitulation reform.53  This tension was notable also in Egypt, where, in 
March of 1917, the Egyptian Council of Ministers appointed a Capitulations Commission to 
consider reforming the system. 
The effect of the “Wilsonian moment” on Egypt’s political situation resulted in much 
more than disillusionment.  It also created a chasm in Egyptian politics from the British and 
American perspective.  Isolated as the “extremist nationalists” Zaghlul and the Wafd, the 
political party arising out of his attempted delegation to the Paris Peace talks, received no respect 
from the West.  This split created a new bargaining partner for the British.  Egyptian political 
figures such as the newly elected post war Prime Minister Mohamed Said Pasha were not 
associated with the “extremism” of Zaghlul.  They were viewed as being more “moderate” and 
as possessing a sense of “tact and moral courage.”  The more conservative Egyptians,  
while desiring an Egypt for Egyptians as sincerely as their more radical 
compatriots, realized that such a thing is impossible at this time, and so they have 
simply held out for an elective Parliament and a responsible Ministry, and for the 
proposition that a larger number of higher government posts be given to Egyptians 
[italics mine for emphasis].54 
 
In light of the Milner Report, it was with this part of the Egyptian political elite that Great Britain 
sought to minimize the costs of maintaining a minimal yet effective hold on Egypt.     
The culmination of this appeasement strategy was the 1922 unilateral declaration of 
Egyptian independence.  Great Britain retained four important reservations that hindered actual 
Egypt sovereignty.  The reservations concerned British control of the Suez Canal, Egyptian 
defense and foreign policy, the Sudan, and the continuance of the Capitulations.  Egyptian 
Parliament drafted a constitution in 1923 to begin their quest for self governance, yet the 
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government dissolved often.  Tensions between Britain and Egypt reached a boiling point after 
the assassination of Sir Lee Stack in 1924.  In this context, Egypt initiated a new strategy to 
address the obstacles to independence.55   
The 1924 Reform Strategy of the Egyptian Parliament56 
In 1924, in the first session of Egypt’s Parliament outlined its agenda for reforming and 
improving Egypt.57  The most pertinent features on the agenda were the general revision of law 
and policy governing Parliament, enabling it to act more effectively, the “overhauling of the 
fiscal system” to ensure a more equitable tax system, Egypt’s entry into the League of Nations, 
and complete independence for Egypt and the Sudan.58  By the end of July, the attempt to raise 
import duty 15% and improve the fiscal system had failed. 59  The international Capitulatory 
cartel stood in the way of Egypt altering their own tax system.  The Egyptians had made some 
bold political moves in the session.  Parliament decided that it would no longer pay for the 
British military presence, which indicated that acceptance of the British military was over.  If 
Great Britain had to pay for its presence, then it no longer could use the claim that Egypt 
welcomed the British military establishment.  Another decision with implications for British 
policy was the Egyptian Parliament’s decision not to pay the interest on the loans incurred during 
the period of Ottoman rule.  It decided that instead the money was to be “deposited in the 
national bank of Egypt until the question is settled by negotiation.”60  The notion that Egypt in 
the post-Ottoman, post Dual-Occupation, and post- British Protectorate, period was responsible 
for the loans was rejected.  Also, the contested interest payments would accumulate interest for 
Egypt rather than Britain.  
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In January 1924, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes revealed the strain as well as 
the potential of American foreign policy concerning Egypt.  In a speech to the Council on 
Foreign Relations in New York.  Hughes noted 
The new spirit of the Near East must be met sympathetically, not by arms, not by 
attempts at dictatorship or by meddlesome intervention, but by candor, directness, 
and just appreciation of nationalistic aims and by a firm but friendly insistence 
upon the discharge of those international obligations, the recognition of which 
affords the only satisfactory basis for the intercourse of nations. In this way the 
Orient and the Occident may find ground for cooperation and the maintenance of 
peace sustained by the reciprocal advantages of cultural relations.61 
 
In other words, Hughes’ foreign policy objectives both challenged Great Britain’s traditional 
foreign policy and yet simultaneously sought the assurances of Capitulations to protect and 
enhance U.S. interests in the region through reciprocal agreements.  Until the potential onset of 
these new reciprocal relationships, international relations was still dependent on the currency of 
extra-territorial rights, especially for the United States which had a less formal experience with 
colonialism in the Near East.  At the same time that his policy was grounded in the traditional 
Western Orientalism, the possibility for a new modus operandi in international relations seemed 
very real because of the concept of reciprocal treatment and the international reputation of the 
Secretary.    Hughes had gained political clout following his impressive showing at the 
Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 in which he proposed a new agreement concerning 
naval arms limitations that would balance the naval conflict between the Powers and recognize 
the rising influence of the United States in the international system.62     
Economic Strategies for Capitulation Reform  
In the late summer and fall of 1924, one of the economic concerns Egypt faced was the 
international consensus regarding Egypt’s responsibility to repay three loans taken during the 
Ottoman era of Egypt in 1855, 1891, and 1894.  These loans were assumed by the British 
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following the outbreak of World War I; however, it is important to note that the British had 
occupied Egypt since 1882.63  The British Foreign Office viewed it as just another ploy by the 
nationalists to evade paying legal obligations.  The United States used similar rhetoric as the 
British in terms of labeling Egyptians that felt it necessary to repay the loans as “responsible” or 
“moderate” as opposed to the “extremists” of the Wafd party, which often demanded complete 
and immediate independence and rejection of the loans.64  The United States’ counselor in the 
London embassy, F.A. Sterling, agreed that “all three loans represent[ed] simply a small part of 
the Ottoman Debt which was taken over by Egypt and for which Egypt is both morally and 
legally responsible.”  Sterling cited as evidence the fact that “responsible” Egyptian businessmen 
think the loans should be repaid in order to avoid having future financial credit problems.65  
Unlike the Capitulatory powers, Zaghlul Pasha questioned Egypt’s liability for these 
loans.66  Zaghlul argued that “when Egypt went to war against Turkey [in World War I], the 
tribute ceased and with it the power of delegation and the debt itself.”  He continued that Egypt 
had not defaulted because “Egypt had given neither promise nor guarantee to the bondholders” 
and had paid “with regularity the interest on all debts she had acknowledged.”  Howell 
interpreted the implications of Zaghlul’s remarks to mean that “if there are any guarantors of the 
bonds, [they] are the British and French Governments and not the Egyptian Government.”67  
As a result of the Parliamentary suspension of payments already discussed, bondholders 
sued Egypt and took the case to the Mixed Courts.68  British policy had not changed since July 
1924 when it had rejected the claim that Egypt was not responsible for the loans.  The United 
States response was dismissive in nature and the U.S. diplomatic correspondence described the 
Egyptian Parliament as being “confused,” in order to discredit their motives and abilities.  This 
analysis strikingly applies to Timothy Mitchell’s concept of colonization which applied 
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Foucault’s concepts of power through control of space and order.  In Mitchell’s work and in the 
1924 correspondence, the perceived ‘dis’order of the Orient was contrasted with the order of the 
West.69       
If there was any doubt about the possibility of justice for Egypt in the Mixed Courts, the 
Court’s decision to side with the bondholders’ claims eliminated it.70  Already in 1924 the Mixed 
Courts came under fire from the Egyptians.  The Egyptian legation situated in London demanded 
that the issue should be resolved at the International Court at The Hague.71  This was a maneuver 
by the Egyptians to create a new venue of justice.  The current venue, the Mixed Courts, was the 
favored old colonial venue for the British to discuss this matter.  The Court no longer provided 
Egyptians with any assurances of a fair hearing.  How could a court maintained and infiltrated by 
capitulatory abuses provide the setting for a hearing on the illegality of loans incurred under 
colonial rule and the threats of debt offered by the Capitulatory Powers?  The Egyptians for this 
reason needed to find recourse outside the Mixed Courts of Egypt. This change of venue had 
implications for United States–Egyptian relations later in the decade as well. 
Egyptian political leaders had many financial strategies to improve their political 
situation and lurking in the background of every idea and plan for advancement was the baggage 
of the Capitulations.  One such political figure is Sidky Pasha, former minister of finance and 
twice elected Minister of the Interior.  He argued in March 1926 before the Mixed Courts Bar in 
Cairo that despite the budget surplus, which was viewed in favorable terms by foreign 
governments and investors, Egypt, in fact, needed to secure more funding.  The time had come 
for Egyptians to build a better infrastructure for themselves, including irrigation projects, health 
care, communications, and transportation.  Sidky foresaw economic decline, if the necessary 
measures were not taken.  According to J. Morton Howell, the Envoy Extraordinary Minister 
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Plenipotenary to Egypt, “his speech is significant as to what is desired along these lines indicated 
by all, or nearly all of Egypt’s leading politicians.”72 The majority of the tax revenue came from 
land, building, cotton export taxes, and customs.  However, for the most part, local taxes 
accounted for much of the national revenue, which accounted for the shortfall in Sidky’s opinion.  
One of the reasons explaining the shortfall was that the commercial class was often not taxed.  
Many foreigners in Egypt belonged to this economic class.73 
Sidky framed the needed increase in tax revenue debate within the Capitulations 
discourse.  Instead of focusing on how Capitulations were the root of the future Egyptian 
financial crisis, he used the concept of the Capitulations, which were so often invoked by foreign 
Powers, to Egypt’s advantage.  He argued that the burden of the taxation should fall not just on 
the poor agricultural classes, but “should rest equally on foreigners and Egyptians alike.”  This 
was the original purpose for the Capitulations, to protect against unfair and unequal treatment of 
foreigners living in Egypt (e.g. poll taxes for people not permanently residing in Egypt), so Sidky 
argued the principal should work in reverse as well.  He even went as far as to say that just as the 
foreign Powers had agreed in the Declaration of London March 17, 1880 amongst themselves to 
ensure “equity of their nationals in Egypt,” this same equity should have applied to a “manifestly 
unfair” tax system that hindered the growing needs of Egypt. 
In addition to framing the debate in terms of the Capitulations, Sidky took the issue a step 
farther.  He viewed Capitulations as instances when former Egyptian governments placated 
foreigners “instead of standing on matters of principle” and an incompatible burden on Egypt’s 
political progress.  Sidky based his strongest argument for the abolition of Capitulations not only 
on a sense of injustice, but also in the contemporaneous international situation.74  The Treaty of 
Lausanne of 1922-23 both revised the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and ended the practice of the 
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Capitulations in Turkey.  He felt the abolishment of the practice in Turkey should also apply to 
Egypt. 
Later in 1926, Allan Dulles of the State Department’s Near Eastern Affairs Division 
wrote a memo detailing a conversation with Egyptian Foreign Minister Samy Pasha.  Samy’s 
strategy was similar to Sidky’s because he also felt that after the abolition of the Capitulations in 
Turkey, the same should happen in Egypt.  However, Samy added another layer to his strategy.  
He appealed to the United States arguing that because of rampant tax evasion and the lack of 
income taxes a new system was needed.  The new system had to be based on the abolition of 
extraterritorial rights and the creation of a new more equitable system.  Samy Pasha appealed to 
the United States to be a leader and be the first to renounce the capitulations system which in 
Samy’s opinion, would have forced the other nations to do the same.  This appeal to the U.S. to 
be a leader in the international system was difficult.  While Dulles discussed the possibility of 
modification of the broken tax system, the opinions of the other Powers would have to be 
considered before the U.S. acted.75  The United States would not be a leader in a cause to 
renounce the only measures that maintain its access to Egypt for the sake of the Egyptian cause.  
While the state of international relations was in flux in the 1920s, the United States was fighting 
to maintain its open door policy in the face of exclusionary European politics.  Yet it was 
unwilling to challenge the foundation of the old colonial system that handicapped the national 
development strategies of not only Egypt but the United States as well. 
 As a result of the failed attempts at rejecting the Ottoman loans and not completely 
successful attempt at raising revenue through other tax plans, the Egyptian government rejected 
the advice of the foreign financial advisors in the Egyptian Ministry of Finance to push the 
publication of the budget back until June 1, 1927.  The Egyptian government set the date for the 
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first of May.  While this might seem a ‘tit for tat’ strategy, the political move is more relevant 
when placed in its proper context as:  
An indication of the determined and steady trend of Egyptian politics toward 
freedom from foreign influences.  This tendency is shown in the disregard of 
advice and warnings given by foreign advisors and foreign government employees 
who are subjected to sarcastic and at times, disrespectful treatment [Italics mine 
for emphasis].76 
 
The likelihood political compromise had diminished as “the agitation for the complete abolition 
of the capitulations was on in campaign form.”  Most likely the proposed policy of closing 
national consular courts in favor of a shift to the Mixed Courts was no longer acceptable to the 
Egyptians.  The political perception relayed to Washington from Cairo was that “privileges 
[capitulations] and immunities are withheld more readily than extended.”77  
Another Egyptian fiscal reform maneuver that alarmed foreign nations involved 
collecting taxes from foreigners.  In a move that characterizes much of the American diplomacy 
of the 1920s, Secretary of State Henry Stimson contacted his American representatives in Egypt 
in 1929 to inform them the U.S. would agree to pay the Ghaffir tax when other countries agreed 
to do so.78  The tax issue, previously raised in 1923, was an Egyptian attempt to reform their tax 
laws and secure funding for public works by extending the mandatory requirements for paying 
the Ghaffir tax to foreigners living in Egypt.  In essence, it was a public safety tax.  The funds 
would pay for an Egyptian security force.  The foreign nations had always counted on free riding 
the British military occupation of Egypt as their source of safety.  Now Egypt sought the ability 
to offer security to individuals and businesses with proper funding.  U.S. Secretary of State 
Charles E. Hughes in addition to citing international laws and protocols from the thirteenth 
century also cited the Real Estate Protocol of 1874 between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire.  
Hughes claimed that this agreement did in fact allow for the collection of a property tax from 
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American citizens, but the proposed extension of the tax was actually an extra tax on tenants and 
dwellers, exceeding the usual domain of property owners in Egypt.  In addition to challenging 
the legal principles of the tax, Hughes also challenged the collection and distribution methods of 
the tax.79  
Unlike the Vacuum Oil company, which often appealed to the State Department to 
protect its interests, utilizing capitulatory objections to paying the tax all together, J. Morton 
Howell shared a different view of American responsibilities in paying the tax.80  While Howell 
did not necessarily think that it was the Americans “moral duty” to pay the tax as the Egyptian 
prime minister did, Howell advised Americans in Egypt to pay the tax if at all possible.  If they 
felt the need to pay it under protest or with the caveat that if the Mixed Courts returned a verdict 
prohibiting the collection of the tax, the American payers would be justly compensated.81       
Eventually, Vacuum Oil communicated their views to the U.S. Government as having 
No objection, in principle, to paying at a reasonable rate for actual service 
rendered.  In the case of the Ghaffir tax, we feel there is no assurance whatsoever 
of service adequate to justify the payment of the tax, on any basis, and we should 
in all probability be forced to maintain, as at present, our own force of guardians.  
However, assuming the situation so develops that payment of this tax becomes 
obligatory; it would appear that the present basis proposed for assessment is not 
immoderate [Italics mine for emphasis].82 
 
This assessment by the only American oil company operating in Egypt at the time revealed the 
essence of the strange post-colonial issues that faced Egypt in the 1920s.  Once again, the labels 
of “reasonable” and “moderate” play an important rhetorical role in identifying how the failures 
of the United States to support the nationalism of Egypt went far beyond that of the “Wilsonian 
Moment.”  As the United States government participated in the rhetoric of Orientalism, so did its 
national economic interests.  The key element of the passage is the concept of “assurance.”  At 
its core meaning, this is the root of the Capitulations and all the baggage that came afterwards.  
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The foreign powers needed a mechanism to protect their own foreign policy in the fluid nature of 
the international framework in the 1920s.  This search for a mechanism to protect national 
interests is the same goal of the strategies of Egypt, Britain, and the United States.     
 However, the Egyptian economic reforms had not completely isolated the United States.  
In 1926 after the Parliamentary agenda was in full swing, the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce 
and King Fuad signed into law a reduction in the cotton tax enacted in 1920 under the control of 
British imperial trade policy.  The cotton tax was reduced to twenty piastres from twenty- five in 
1922 and thirty-five in 1920.  This political- economic, diplomatic move fit rather nicely into the 
new economic order sought by Herbert Hoover, serving as Secretary of Commerce from 1921-
27.  International trade was the foundation of Hoover’s new world order and government 
controls on foreign raw materials raised flags at Hoover’s department.  While the United States 
pursued the “Open Door” in terms of oil, archaeology, and politics, the traditional economic 
interests are also important for the triangular relationship of the three countries.  While, Herbert 
Hoover and his assistant Julius Klein, created information agencies around the globe to facilitate 
better trade relationships and business opportunities, the United States also won the battle that 
began at the Genoa Conference in 1922 about what the new gold standard would be.  The British 
lost their position as the leading world’s creditor in mid-decade, as most of the world switched to 
the system backed by the United States.  It was no coincidence that the new economic order that 
challenged the more nationalistic trade barriers before 1919 took effect simultaneously with the 
Egyptian strategy.83 
Legal Reform Strategies 
The proposed revision of the Mixed Courts was in and of itself already a strategy to 
reform an institution which main purpose was to reform the Capitulations agreements, relics 
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from the days that the Ottoman Empire ruled Egypt.  The matters of concern pertained to the sale 
of narcotics, white slave trade, trade fraud, the number of judges on the courts, the possibility for 
Egyptians to become the President and Vice President of Mixed Courts, and the possibility for 
Egypt to give awards to judges on the Mixed Courts for their service.84  The reasons for the 
change in the number and nationality of judges is better understood after reviewing the triangular 
diplomatic dance of the United States, Great Britain, and Egypt involving the Mixed Courts in 
the 1920s.  
Reforming the Mixed Courts was not solely in the interests of the Egyptians.  Already in 
February of 1921, Great Britain wrote to the United States that the British were seeking to 
modify the privileges to “protect the country” in hopes of appeasing the Egyptian nationalists. 85  
While the memo referred to protecting the country of Egypt, if the reference is put into a 
historical and diplomatic context, “protecting the country” also meant protecting Great Britain.  
The framework of the proposed arrangement created the context within which foreign nations 
sought justice in Egypt.   
The specifics were that Great Britain, still then the protectorate power, wanted every 
nation to close its consular courts.  The controversy between the United States and Great Britain 
was the foundation of diplomatic maneuverings to come.  Without damaging national interests, 
Great Britain could only soothe the Egyptian nationals’ complaints after other countries in Egypt 
closed their consular courts, in order to maintain their self appointed special relationship with 
Egypt.86  If the United States closed its courts, then at least Britain would not have to worry 
about being the only nation to lose power due to the nationalist movement in Egypt. Along with 
these closures, the British initially sought to “reorganize and extend the jurisdiction of the Mixed 
Tribunals and the application to all foreigners in Egypt of the legislation enacted by the Egyptian 
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legislature.”87  The British promised both no discriminatory policies vis- à- vis the United States 
and the transfer of authority to the Egyptians with the quid pro quo of the closure of all foreign 
consular courts.88  The United States responded in July 1921, to a telegram from 1920, about this 
issue.89  The United States did not wish to possess privileges that were detrimental to Egypt.  
This self-denying statement had a caveat attached to it, on the British proposal to end the 
consular courts.  The Americans had concerns about the British selecting the consular courts as 
the mechanism to achieve their goals.  The Americans sought some sort of assurance concerning 
the type of government and the type of justice that would exist in Egypt once the American 
consular courts ceased to function.  The U.S. Secretary of State’s Charles Evans Hughes 
response was legal in nature and sought to frame the discussion in terms of American justice.   
Citing an Act of Congress from 1874, the United States could and would close their 
consular courts when American justice was available in a venue that could protect American 
interests. 90  Charles Hughes also wrote that his country possessed treaties with both the 
Ottomans and Egypt and only bilateral negotiations with Egypt could have affected them in any 
way.  One of the most important points on the British proposal was that “any renunciation of 
rights and privileges… would in effect be made in favor of Egypt,” not Great Britain.91  The 
United States was not going to negotiate through Great Britain about American rights and 
privileges.  The U.S. sought to deal directly with Egypt.  In 1921, the United States demanded 
“most favorable nation status” for trade and diplomatic standing.92  This demand carried the 
potential to diminish Britain’s status, for the British had already promised the Americans equal 
treatment to Great Britain.  Yet Great Britain, while Britain could offer a similar status and 
treatment, it could in fact not agree to the status of America as a most favored nation because 
that status would undermine the vision that Britain had of itself as a protectorate power.93   
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While the Americans maintained objections, they stated that shifting to the Mixed Courts 
away from the consular courts as a modus operandi “would probably not be objectionable.”94  
Great Britain and the United States also demonstrated an ability to agree on other international 
issues such as American schools in Egypt.  While the United States had softened its position on 
the abolition of the consular courts, it demanded more information about this new system that 
Britain wanted to establish in Egypt, and it wanted the information shared with other countries to 
prevent misunderstandings.95  While seemingly an innocent request, this sort of sharing of 
information and decision making influence could discretely steal power away from Great Britain. 
Within this larger context of international support for the Mixed Courts amidst diplomatic 
maneuvering over legal and political overtures, a smaller battle took place in 1921.  That battle 
involved the replacement of retired Judge Somerville Tuck.  The United States was reminded 
that it could nominate a successor to the retired American judge. Two nominees were put forth, 
yet both were rejected for seemingly unknown reasons. Pierre Crabitès and Ellery Stowell both 
possessed the necessary skills. Crabitès was then serving on the District Court in Cairo and 
Stowell was well trained according to Hughes.  Hughes wrote to the British Ambassador in a 
tone conveying disbelief.  His agitation was evident in his finding that earlier, in 1919, the 
British had approved a man named Philip Marshall Brown to be a possible successor to Judge 
Tuck.  Mr. Brown had no legal training and possessed none of the desirable attributes of the 
rejected judges.96  The eventual acceptance of another nominee for the Court of Appeals, Jasper 
Yeats Brinton, allowed the U.S. to agree to a continuation of the Mixed Courts with American 
representation protected.97    
The restoration of the number of American judges was an important diplomatic episode.  
It allowed the United States to agree to the continuation of the Courts, but also because in 1921, 
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Great Britain had added two more British judges to the Court of Appeals and one to the District 
Court.  The country with the closest number of judges was Italy with five, two less than Britain’s 
seven.  France, Belgium, the United States, and Greece all had four positions.98  In the larger 
context, the political elements of this particular drama are representative of the tension between 
Britain and the United States in the 1920s concerning the gold standard, rubber, and naval arms.  
Contrary to Jasper Y. Brinton’s claims about the non- political motives amongst the nations 
concerning the promotion of judges, the denial of Crabitès as worthy and capable of a promotion 
to the Court of Appeals appeared to be nothing but political.99  In March 1921, Crabitès had 
already earned a reputation as the American judge who had ruled in favor of expanding the 
jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts to include cases of public domain.  His public domain ruling 
allowed the opening the tomb of King Tutankhamen in the interest of “science and civilization” 
over any claims of national rights of the Egyptians.  The Egyptians later blamed an accident that 
caused Crabitès to have one of his legs amputated on the curse of King Tut.100  This animosity 
over the ruling could have easily contributed to the unwillingness to promote him to the Court of 
Appeals, especially in the context of the British appeasement of Egyptian nationalism.            
As was the case with the Ghaffir tax, the Egyptian Government began to flex its muscles 
in other areas of international interest.  Another pressing issue for the U.S. State Department was 
the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s claim to the promised fifty percent of the artifacts recovered 
from all excavations, a custom since the 1912 Egyptian law that granted the rights to the 
American archaeologists.  The archaeologists petitioned the State Department for assistance, 
because without the guaranteed returns from the digs, they would no longer be able to excavate 
the sites.101  Hughes instructed Howell to gauge what Britain’s, France’s, and Italy’s opinions 
were on the expiration of the 1912 law that affected them as well.  Strangely enough, Howell 
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was not instructed to speak with the Egyptian authorities on the matter.  His instructions were to 
build a coalition, and if the coalition was not possible or if the other powers had already 
independently sought remedies, Howell was to contact Hughes before making another move.  
Hughes wanted to be forceful with the Egyptians in the negotiations. 102  He felt that the 
Egyptians should take the assistance of the needed foreign archaeologists, on the archaeologists’ 
terms, or lose them all together.  British high society and diplomats were already underway in 
their opposition to any changes in the status quo.  Both the United States and Great Britain 
opposed the idea of granting Egypt ownership and distribution rights of all unearthed 
materials.103  The opposition led to a one-year continuance of the 1912 law because a long-term 
agreement was then impossible. 
Nearing the completion of this moratorium, the talks resumed.  The discussion among the 
American diplomats focused primarily on the timing of the talks in conjunction with an appeal in 
the Mixed Courts involving King Tut archaeologist Howard Carter.  The issue was the legality of 
Crabitès’ public domain ruling that led to the unearthing of King Tut’s Tomb.104  The 
Metropolitan Museum conducted the substantive diplomacy with Egyptian authorities.  The 
bottom line of their argument was that in order to finance not only the excavating trips, but also 
the exhibits back home, certain assurances were needed to make their excavations profitable.105  
Egypt did not want to be restricted legally with a fifty percent guarantee.  The Egyptians wanted 
to have first choice in any objects found in order to complete collections and to have the primary 
collection in their own country.  Only after their own needs were met would Egypt distribute the 
artifacts.106  The British and American shared interests in protecting the foreign archaeologists 
forged a temporary alliance against the actions of a determined Egyptian nationalist 
movement.107  Business interests and institutional involvement initiated both the British and 
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American presence in Egypt and likewise, the corresponding diplomatic pressure to protect those 
interests.  The US seemed content as long as its interests were protected, whether through 
diplomatic channels or the mixed court.   
As the new regulations concerning archaeological excavations went into effect under 
protest in the Mixed Courts, the conflict between the foreign archaeologists and the Egyptians 
continued into 1926.108  The new Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, communicated the 
proposed plan of action to Howell in Egypt.  Howell was to discuss confidentially the matter 
with the British and French Foreign Offices.  Kellogg had composed a proposal for the Egyptians 
to consider.  The proposal was a fine example of salesmanship.  The mechanism that Kellogg 
suggested was that the Egyptians complete their own collections first and then offer equivalent 
pieces to participating American excavators.  Kellogg focused on trying to convince the Egyptian 
officials that most of the archaeological contributions in the past twenty-five years have been 
made possible through the assistance of American institutions.  He continued that the 
relationship was beneficial to both countries.  American universities and museums were enriched 
both culturally and financially.  These exhibits also led to an increase in tourism for Egypt.  
Kellogg explained that what made foreign excavators and institutions nervous was that the 
assurances of receiving compensation for their work disappeared with the enforcement of the 
1912 law.  The United States understood the need to lower the percentage, but some sort of 
objective assurance was needed.109 
The British would not support Kellogg’s proposal until Austen Chamberlain, the British 
Foreign Secretary, was convinced by the French who were also worried about their investments 
in Egypt and the rise of the United States.110  Eventually various American institutions, as the 
diplomatic ordeal continued, reached an agreement with the Egyptian government.  The 
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American legation of experts and archaeologists in Egypt had reached verbal agreements with 
the Egyptian government, but the American institutions, including museums, called for the U.S. 
to intervene to assure that their goals would be met.111  The American Minister in Egypt 
attempted to get the Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister to insert legal language that would insure 
that the American archaeologists and institutions would profit from their work.  Despite the 
Egyptian Minister’s deletion of most of the assurances sought by the Americans, within two 
months the American legation informed the Secretary of State that the legation had decided to 
“accept the Egyptian Government’s assurances of liberal intentions,” even without the legal 
guarantees.112  Following the Mixed Courts’ ruling that Egypt had the right to determine their 
own laws regarding antiquities, the “liberal” offer was the best offer available.  A much different 
ruling was possible if Judge Crabitès had been promoted to the same Court and heard the appeals 
case stemming from his ruling.  
The distribution formula of archaeological finds was not the only issue resolved in 1926.  
A source of contention between the United States and Great Britain since 1920 was the 
conviction of a British citizen by an American Consul at Alexandria.  Great Britain’s objection 
from 1920 remained the same in 1926.  The British contention was that the United States had no 
authority to try any British national in an American consular court.  The Americans argued case 
precedent, which established a long standing tradition of treating foreign nationals who willing 
sought refuge aboard an American ship as part of the crew.  As a result, these foreign nationals 
were also subject to the laws that govern that ship.  The British viewed this American 
international jurisprudence as “unjustifiable,” an “error on the part of local United States 
Authorities.”  Most importantly, that it was imperative to “prevent reoccurrence.”113  The 
magnitude of this diplomatic encounter would not register on most scales, if not for the six years 
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of legal arguments between the United States and Great Britain since the British sailor’s prison 
term was only fourteen days.114   
The entirety of the diplomatic spat entailed the unacceptability of the method of justice 
by the United States to Great Britain.  The consular courts traditionally tried cases involving only 
the same nationality, yet the United States argued that the sailor was part of the crew of an 
American flagged vessel and under U.S. law.  If this premise was accepted, then the American 
consul was allowed to handle criminal cases with penalties less than a hundred dollars and less 
than sixty-day jail terms.115  According to American law, the verdict was final in these 
circumstances.  In 1860, Congress passed a law stating that United States consuls were to be 
regarded and held to the standards of a judicial officer.  Britain, as with every other country, 
followed its own guidelines for conducting consular courts.  A network of local and provincial 
British courts was under a supreme consular court that empanelled a six-person jury.   
While the objection to the conviction of the sailor was but a microcosm of the larger 
debate about the role of the judicial system and foreign political influence in Egypt, this 
relatively larger debate between Great Britain and the United States about justice and political 
influence revealed their political motives about Egypt.  Though independent, the only function 
Egypt served in the whole exchange was serving as a host site for the consular courts.  The 
United States’ Secretary of State argued that the imprisoned sailor “owe[d] for that time to the 
country to which the ship on which he is serving belongs, a temporary allegiance, and must be 
held to all its responsibilities.”116  Britain’s objections, placed in a larger context, revealed that it 
sought to maximize its political position in Egypt by utilizing this particular case as a basis for 
demanding the closure of all American consular courts that could jeopardize British foreign 
policy objectives.  Not surprisingly, neither country drew the rather ironic parallel between the 
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sailor’s “temporary allegiance” and the disregard for Egyptian sovereignty that both the United 
States and Great Britain exercised in conducting their consular justice and demand for the 
Capitulations on Egyptian soil. 
From 1926, through the beginning of 1927, the United States and Egypt bantered back 
and forth about reform of the Mixed Courts and proportional American representation in the 
Courts.  The Egyptians maintained that they had always reserved the right to choose their own 
judges.117  The United States grew more demanding in their need to be recognized as the world 
power they had become.118  Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, steered the U.S.’s diplomacy 
down a historical path that was similar to that of the British.  Kellogg argued about proportional 
representation and refused to consent immediately to Egyptian proposals to strengthen or merely 
to relocate their own institutions.  He and American businesses in Egypt directly challenged 
Egyptian civil authorities.  The United States and American companies argued that Egypt had a 
double standard for petroleum storage by allowing Greek companies to use illegal and unsafe 
storage barges.  The main motivation for involvement of the United States’ government was that 
American companies were paying extra fees for the stipulations laid out by the Egyptian 
Parliament.119  The objection was that special privileges given to Greek companies could not be 
tolerated.120  The irony of the parallels to the Capitulations was seemingly lost on the Americans 
arguing the case.   
The proposed changes to the Mixed Courts drew many international responses.  Lord 
George Lloyd, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, refused to acknowledge any aspects of 
the proposal until the anti- British public relations campaign stopped in the newspapers.  Lloyd 
felt that instead of airing their grievances in public, the reforms should be circulated in private 
among the Powers.121  Regarding the particulars of the Egyptian proposal, extending the 
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jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts to include criminal matters concerned Lloyd.  Britain saw no 
reason why the President or Vice President could not be Egyptian; however, the position did not 
have to be necessarily Egyptian.  Also, Great Britain demanded one of the foreign seats if the 
number of judges was reduced or a new chamber created.122  Much in the same manner as 
Britain, Italy and France had serious concerns about the reforms, and unless they were rewarded 
with the potentially scarce judicial seats, they refused to reduce the number of judges.  As North 
Winship of the State Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs noted in his memo, if Italy 
and France were to get seats in a general reduction of total judgeships, that would inevitably lead 
to strife amongst the Powers about the proportionality of representation and capitulatory 
rights.123   
The response of the United States to the Egyptian proposal was similar to that of Great 
Britain.  Franklin Mott Gunther, the American minister to Cairo, informed the Egyptian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Hafez Afifi Bey, that as long as the extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed 
Courts was applicable to U.S. law and previous agreements between the two nations, that the 
proposal was acceptable.  The United States positioned its support of the creation of a new 
chamber as quid pro quo for one of those seats going to an American judge.  The foundation of 
the United States argument was that the positions on a proposed new chamber should decided on 
a “principal of equality.”  It is of interest that this concept of ‘equality’ was the foundation of 
both the arguments for the continuation of the Capitulations by the foreign powers and by the 
Egyptians calling for an end to the extra- territorial privileges.  While the Egyptians had 
proposed the creation of a new chamber of judges, both the United States and Great Britain 
increased the acceptable minimum number of judges to five in their respective correspondence 
with Egypt in order to increase their odds against Egyptian nationalism.124   
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Along with the “principle of equality”, the United States had another issue with the 
selection of judges that had pestered the United States the entire previous decade.  Gunther 
notified the State Department that he had deleted the last line of text from the message for the 
Egyptian Minister.  The deleted line read: “It is felt that outstanding judicial ability should be the 
sole criterion upon which election to these offices should be based.”  He responded to 
Washington that judicial ability “does not represent the principle traditionally followed by the 
Mixed Court judiciary in the conduct of elections” and for this reason, the line that he omitted 
was “unrealistic.”  Traditionally seniority played a much larger role in the election and 
promotion of judges on those Courts.125  This was the very same issue that plagued the United 
States during the Judge Pierre Crabitès’ controversy earlier in the decade.  The United States 
wanted to keep pace with the other Powers and definitely resorted to playing the Capitulations 
card when needed. However, if the United States could have had judges serving on the Mixed 
Courts based on judicial ability as opposed to qualifications based on the Capitulations, national 
interests on many different levels would have been served.   
A New World Order for International Relations a Decade after Wilson 
The newly elected government of Prime Minister Sarwat Pasha called for a Capitulations 
conference for 1928 to address ridding Egypt of the onerous Capitulations.  The Egyptian 
strategy involved having the Capitulations “replaced by an institution more in harmony with 
modern times.”  Despite praising Sarwat’s realism, North Winship, of the State Department Near 
Eastern Division, also portrayed Sarwat Pasha in the same manner as Great Britain.  The United 
States and Britain defined “moderate” Egyptian political figures as being less demanding than 
the more “extremist” group the Wafd.126  Egypt’s dilemma was the same in 1927 as it was in 
1919, wanting Wilson’s words of national self- determination to apply to them, yet they were 
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still confronting the centuries old practice of the Capitulations that fostered both Orientalist and 
colonial foreign policy in Egypt.  The Egyptian strategy also enlarged to attack the nature of the 
1922 reservations claimed by Britain just as the Treaty of Lausanne presented the Egyptians with 
material to fuel their argument for the abolition of the Capitulations.127  After learning of the 
results from Lausanne, Egyptians wanted the Capitulations abolished in Egypt especially if 
Europe had agreed to abolish the Capitulations in Turkey, the former seat of government for the 
Ottoman Empire.  The maintenance of the Capitulations was also one of the four reservations 
Britain placed on the independence of Egypt in 1922.  A strategy to abolish the Capitulations 
was both a challenge to British colonialism and the international system that perpetuated the 
Capitulatory abuses in Egypt.    Within an international system in flux, the Egyptians utilized the 
opportunities presented through the diplomatic events of the 1920s to weaken the colonial ties to 
Britain and their former occupier the Ottomans.  
 In the opinion of Lord Lloyd, if the powers were interested in maintaining the 
Capitulations, they needed to address the concerns of the Egyptians and not ignore them.128  
After a decade of diplomatic wrangling over and among both Foreign and Egyptian 
governments, the British Foreign Ministry issued a text to the Egyptian Government that 
revealed the “extreme limit to which British Government would go” to meet the demands of the 
more moderate nationalists.129 Much like the Egyptian strategy, Great Britain felt that a new 
mechanism was needed to ensure the legitimate interests of foreigners in Egypt.  In sum, Great 
Britain sought to establish an alliance with Egypt.  This goal contradicted the rhetoric used 
during the Protectorate Phase and throughout the 1920s about Britain’s special relationship with 
Egypt.  The creation of a new alliance implied that the previous one was false and imposed upon 
Egypt.  The new relationship would be more reciprocal and required ambassadors and outlined 
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policies in the case of third party (nation) disputes.130  A policy for both bilateral and multilateral 
relations was a significant change from the days of the High Commissioner and of preventing the 
Egyptians from making bilateral agreements with any other party.  Disputes would be settled 
peacefully fitting within the general political will of the time epitomized by the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact and through the diplomatic channels provided by Egypt’s entrance into the League of 
Nations.131    
Great Britain was ready to make both the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt the 
responsibility of the Egyptian Government; however, the issue of the Capitulations blocked 
change.  This British acknowledgement that the Capitulations were no longer consistent with the 
modern world was the only concession to Egypt included in the communication.132  The same 
strategy that had existed since 1920 would still govern policy liberalization.  Britain would 
relinquish its Capitulatory rights once other countries abandoned the use of consular courts in 
Egypt as opposed to the Mixed Courts.133  This focus on changing the venue of justice played a 
major role in the British proposal.   
Several areas of negotiation still favored Britain.  One such issue was the Suez Canal.  No 
matter what the British relinquished in their proposal, Suez was not on the British negotiating 
table.  Much like in the 1922 reservations on complete independence, the British still reserved a 
place for themselves in the chance that Egypt would seek foreign advice both political and 
military.  The most likely reason being to prevent the Egyptians from seeking assistance from the 
United States or the Soviet Union.  These particular clauses reveal the distrust of the 
Egyptians.134  Despite the British proposal to create a new two-way alliance, Great Britain still 
needed a mechanism to prevent Egypt from seeking actual independence.  The British election of 
1929 provided no such mechanism.  Despite the British Liberal Party’s victory, which opposed 
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Lord Lloyd’s heavy handed policies in Egypt, the Egyptian Liberal Party of Sarwat Pasha, 
nonetheless rejected the British overtures as insufficient.135  
Three very important international treaties shaped the United States policy at the close of 
the decade.  Separate treaties of arbitration and conciliation between the United States and Egypt 
along with the International Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War (also known as the 
Kellogg- Briand Peace Pact) were among the major forces reshaping the international system. 
This third treaty known for it outlawing of war as an instrument of national policy shared legacy 
with the other lofty peace plans of Paris in 1919.136  For some in Egypt, however, the pact 
offered possibility in the political struggle against the remaining hold Great Britain held on the 
country as a result of the reservations of the February 28, 1922 unilateral declaration.  In addition 
to the maintenance of the Capitulations, Great Britain also reserved the right to keep a military 
presence in Egypt.  Some Egyptian political figures, including the Wafd, reasoned that if Egypt 
signed the Kellogg- Briand treaty, the British reservation to complete independence concerning 
military affairs would be nullified.137  In other words, if war was no longer a viable national 
strategy, then Great Britain could no longer justify a military threat against Egypt and the Sudan.  
Of course, this could have affect the progress of the agenda for national development outlined in 
the 1924 Parliamentary assembly, as Mahmoud Passiouni (Vice President and President ad 
interim of the Egyptian Senate) and the President of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies indicated 
by attaching their names to separate, yet nearly identical political addresses.138 
The United States accomplished a major interwar policy objective spanning several 
administrations by creating a change in venue for international justice.  The new venues provided 
options for the United States to avoid institutions that had not developed in conjunction with the 
rise in stature of the United States following World War I.  The Treaty of Arbitration between 
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the U.S. and Egypt advocated the new system of settling conflicts without using war as an 
instrument of national policy.  The Permanent Court of Arbitration established at the Hague by 
the convention of October 18, 1907 was the preferred venue for settling disputes through 
arbitration and not war.139  While “other competent tribunals” were an option, the League of 
Nations was not an available venue.  Shifting authority to the League would enhance Britain’s 
strategy and weaken the national policy objectives of the United States.  While, the appeal of 
signing bilateral treaties enhanced Egyptian strategy, the focus of this treaty revealed that the 
United States was not conducting altruistic foreign policy.  The new system for justice would not 
apply to American domestic issues or third parties and the Monroe Doctrine would reign 
supreme over any attempt by a nation to use the treaties to infiltrate the American sphere of 
influence.  The American treaties sought to bypass the possibility of forfeiting sovereignty as the 
Capitulations had done to Egypt.   
The Treaty of Conciliation established the newly created permanent Internal Commission 
for Arbitration as the new venue for disputes not solved by diplomacy or other competent 
tribunals.  An entirely different method of selecting judges was established, thereby eliminating 
the problems that the United States had with the Mixed Courts.  Egypt and the United States had 
different motivations, but found common ground in this new judicial venue, namely challenging 
the British vision for international relations.  The arbitration commission had five members: one 
from each country involved in the dispute, two judges from different countries selected by the 
suing countries, and the final seat would be a mutually decided choice from a neutral nation.  
The treaty established that “mutual agreement” was the cornerstone for most policies 
surrounding the Commission. 140  This “mutual agreement” without the inclusion of Great Britain 
satisfied both the United States’ and Egyptian development strategies during the 1920s.         
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In the diplomatic correspondence that led to the agreements between the United States 
and Egypt, one of the issues raised was the final ratification of Kellogg- Briand.  The Secretary 
of State Frank B. Kellogg informed his minister in Cairo Gunther: “There is no need to await 
ratification by the Powers which signed the Treaty on August 27.  The deposit of Acts of 
Adherence with the government of the United States prior thereto will automatically make 
adhering Powers party to the treaty at the instant the treaty becomes effective.”141  In the context 
of the diplomatic episodes of the 1920s involving archaeology, taxes, and justice in which the 
essence of the arguments can be reduced to the issue of “assurances,” it is significant that the acts 
of deposit with the United States would reflect the legal basis of the new international system.  
Much like the gold standard debate that fueled much tension between the United States and 
Britain – paired with the insistence of the American and British museums that they deposit 
archaeological finds in their home museums - possession seemed to indicate power.  Possession 
of treaties shaping the new world order put the United States in a strong position at the end of the 
decade.142  Likewise, Egypt was empowered by the implementation of its own development 
strategy.  It is important to realize that Egypt’s small victory was another step and not a solution 
to the autonomy issue.  
The strategies of searching for new avenues to protect national interests in a changing 
international system were evident in the international nature of the triangular microcosm of 
British-Egyptian-American relations.  While the Capitulations would exist until an agreement at 
the Montreaux Convention of 1936 to end the practice of the extra-territorial rights in Egypt and 
to eventually phase out the Mixed Courts in 1949, Egyptian strategies had found some success 
regarding their political ability to reform their domestic and foreign affairs.143 This was a 
realization of the goal of the 1924 Parliament.  As the historical record indicates, Egypt had 
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made significant strides between the years 1924-1930.  Because of the leverage that Egypt 
possessed in the international market for the prized commodity of Egyptian cotton Egypt not 
only had the political will but also had seemingly developed the bargaining capacity to bring the 
Powers to the negotiating table.144  In late 1929, Egypt sought to revise its Customs Regulations 
(import and export duty schedules February 1931) by threatening at first the possibility of double 
tariff rates for those countries not agreeing to most-favored-nation trading status with Egypt.  
The Egyptians then threatened that those not willing to reach an accord would face double tariff 
rates.  Diplomatic extensions were available for those nations who demonstrated a willingness to 
negotiate with Egypt. 145 
 The United States viewed the strategy of “increasing the revenues of the Egyptian 
Treasury and at the same time placing on the Foreign Powers this burden of negotiating with it 
Customs treaties” as “hasty, even if technically correct” in the legal sense.146  The United States 
and Great Britain both eventually agreed, just before the February deadline, to the new tariffs 
pending objections over the Capitulatory “rights.”  What was missing from the diplomatic 
correspondence was the usual discussion of how and which venue the Powers would pursue their 
Capitulatory rights.147  This absence of venue coupled with the agreements under protest of 
Britain and the United States indicated the effectiveness of the timing of the strategy to revise 
import and export tariff levels.  The United States’ only bargaining chip was to tie support of the 
Egyptian proposal to the acceptance of unconditional most favored nation trade agreement as a 
temporary fix, a mere eleven days before the new tariffs would take place.148 This would serve as 
a stop gap measure until the treaty could be completed.149  However, the Egyptian Ministry of 
Finance objected because in its opinion the only possible need for such an agreement was if the 
United States planned to tax Egyptian exports into the United States at a higher rate than other 
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countries.150  This implied that the American proposal sought a legal assurance while the 
Egyptian Ministry replied that Egyptian customs regulations would be a reflection of how other 
countries treated Egyptian products in their markets.  
The attempt of Egypt to open economic ties with the Soviet Union in 1930 was part of 
the debate over Egypt’s economic development plan and shaped the context in which the United 
States and Great Britain made their decisions.  One plan called for the disposal of internationally 
desired Egyptian cotton in markets wherever possible and the other demanded industrial 
development at home.  The Egyptian Undersecretary of Finance Ahmed Hamdi Seif el Nasr Bey 
supported the higher price (higher than the United States’ prices) for Egyptian cotton because he 
believed it ensured quality, except when the local merchants removed the cotton from the 
domestic market to get a higher guaranteed price from their government.151  These are issues that 
both the United States and Great Britain faced in their status as ‘power’ nations in the context of 
the early years of the world economic depression.152  These strategies revealed that Egypt was 
placing its own domestic politics within the larger international situation in order to better Egypt.  
The fluid nature of the international system that had been altered so much by the diplomacy of 
the 1920s created the possibility for several intentions in the Egyptian reform strategy of 1924 to 
be realized.  Egypt began to strategically place itself in the new international system as opposed 
to being controlled by anachronistic agreements that reflected 19th century imperialism.  
Conclusion 
     
Following World War I, Britain faced challenges to its international strategy from both 
the United States and Egypt.  Within the context of the more widely studied tensions between 
Britain and the United States, the inclusion of the Egyptian strategy offers valuable insight that 
leads to more complete understanding of 1920s diplomacy.  In the tradition as Husayn al- 
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Marsafi’s The Essay on Eight Words in 1881, several key concepts are important to this study.  
Words such as reasonable, equitable, and moderate are incorporated into the strategies of the 
United States and Britain to protect their national interests in Egypt as if it was a zero-sum game.  
In instances when Egyptian political leaders demanded the application of these concepts to their 
own agenda, the implications assumed different meanings and posed further obstacles for the 
Egyptian goal of independence.  The physical act of ‘depositing’ revealed a sense of power that 
Foucault would realize and appreciate.  Possession of mummified kings, treasure, new treaties, 
and gold indicated power in the 1920s much as they had in earlier decades.  Negotiations took 
place throughout the decade concerning the legal validity and political viability of pursuing these 
objects as ‘rights.’  The episodes revealed that at the core of every diplomatic drama was 
insecurity with the existing system of assurances of good faith dealing, namely aside from 
collusion for self-gain, a lack of trust existed.  Perhaps the most revealing evidence for the 
insecurity with the old world in the 1920s was the fact that at the end of the decade, political 
maneuvers that matching the vision of the League of Nations and the Wilsonian Moment were 
still being devised and implemented. 
While Egyptian nationalism had used political, legal, and economic reform strategies 
before and during the 1920s, the Egyptian strategies of 1924-1930 attacked the root of their 
problems, namely Capitulations.  Internationalism in and of itself was not the answer to the 
sovereignty crisis of Egypt.  The Capitulations, the Mixed Courts, the various legal, political, and 
economic reform strategies, and physical revolt against colonial occupation all were inherently 
international and very problematic.  The Egyptian political maneuvers at the end of the decade 
had more potential than the previous reform strategies that failed.  Egypt created leverage on 
Great Britain by finding new avenues for their legal, economic, and political platforms through 
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bilateral and multilateral treaties with the United States.  While Nubar Pasha argued for the 
creation of the Mixed Courts of Egypt in 1869 to remove the political dimensions of diplomacy 
from the corrupt Capitulations system, Egyptian strategies of 1924-1930 used both bilateral and 
multilateral diplomatic approaches to begin the process of excavating the relics of Ottoman, 
British, and International tutelage from Egyptian soil.  Events in Egypt in the 1920s demonstrate 
that European ascendancy was beginning to ebb in the colonial arena.153  British hegemonic 
influence in Egypt was waning due to the leverage that Egypt and the United States exerted on 
the new system of international relations following World War I.  These economic, political, and 
legal battles fought in Egypt are the beginning of the British slow retreat from ‘East of Suez’, 
which was completed in the 1960s.  
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